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Abstract
In the later part of 2007 China will be at yet another watershed moment. The 17th Party
Congress will be held, where new leaders of China will jockey into position. Will these leaders
proceed on the slow and cautious trail set out by their predecessors? Will they regress to the
demands of the ultra-conservative “left-wingers”? Or will the likely rejuvenated leadership be bold
enough to face the many challenges with a more progressive agenda? This Essay addresses these
questions by briefly describing and analyzing the development and the potential of the Chinese
judiciary. In this analysis, the judiciary functions more generally as an indicator of legal and
even political reforms. Part I of this Essay explains China’s current position and its possible
avenues for the future. Part II briefly elaborates on the imperial history of the Chinese judiciary.
Part III describes the reform process over the last twenty-five years, focusing on the more recent
developments. Part IV analyzes the present situation, concluding with some thoughts on the future
reform process as an indication of where the broader reform agenda is–or must be–heading.

ESSAY
THE REFORM PATH OF THE CHINESE
JUDICIARY: PROGRESS OR STAND-STILL?
Jonas Grimheden*
INTRODUCTION
In the later part of 2007 China will be at yet another watershed moment. The 17th Party Congress will be held, where new
leaders of China will jockey into position.' Will these leaders
proceed on the slow and cautious trail set out by their predecessors? Will they regress to the demands of the ultra-conservative
"left-wingers"? Or will the likely rejuvenated leadership be bold
enough to face the many challenges with a more progressive
agenda?
This Essay addresses these questions by briefly describing
and analyzing the development and the potential of the Chinese
judiciary.2 In this analysis, the judiciary functions more generally as an indicator of legal and even political reforms. Part I of
this Essay explains China's current position and its possible avenues for the future. Part II briefly elaborates on the imperial
history of the Chinese judiciary. Part III describes the reform
process over the last twenty-five years, focusing on the more recent developments. Part IV analyzes the present situation, concluding with some thoughts on the future reform process as an
* BA (in East and South-East Asian Studies/Chinese), LLB, LLM, LLD (all from
Lund University, Sweden), Senior Researcher at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund, Sweden. The author would like to thank
Fu Hualing and ZhuJingwen for stimulating discussions. The FordhamInternationalLaw
Journal would like to thank Susan Tan, third-year J.D. candidate, for her invaluable
assistance translating the Chinese documents associated with this piece.
1. Five years after that, in 2012, major changes in the very top leadership will likely
take place. See Lyman Miller, The Road to the 17th Party Congress, 18 CHINA LEADERSHIP
MONITOR 1, 7 (2006), available at http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm18
lm.pdf.
2. So far, this Essay has referenced "the judiciary," irrespective of the Chinese language connotations. Judiciary is here limited to the system of courts, excluding the
Procuratorate-the special form of prosecutors with a broad supervisory mandate in
China. See George Ginsburgs & Arthur Stahnke, The Cenesis of the People's Procuratoratein
Communist China 1949-1951, 20 CHINA Q. 1, 83 (1964).
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indication of where the broader reform agenda is-or must beheading.
I. CHINA OF TODAY: POSITION AND POSSIBLE AVENUES
The 2007 National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party,3 held every five years and upcoming in late 2007, is a
time for assessment of the past and of future expectations.
Formally-and increasingly-the National People's Congress
("NPC"),4 the supreme State body of the 1982 Constitution,' is
the highest decision-making political body. With the parliamentary system used in China, the some 3,000-member NPC is at the
very highest echelon of politics. Over the last twenty years, reality is increasingly catching up with this theoretical construct,
making the NPC a real power-entity, although theory is still way
ahead. NPC delegates serve a five-year term and meet briefly
every spring. The Spring 2007 NPC is the fifth and, consequently, the last session of the 10th NPC. The eleventh NPC will
convene for the first time in Spring 2008.
Irrespective of the position of the NPC, the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP"), with some 2,000 delegates, dominates the
political agenda with a predominant position in China generally
as well as in the NPC. The CCP has some seventy percent of the
seats in the NPC and thus exerts strong influence over nonmembers.6 The very fact that the new CCP National Congress
takes place a few months before the new NPC every fifth year
adds to its position of primacy. It is therefore highly important
to observe the positioning and appointments that are made at
the National Congress in 2007 to understand the developments
and possibly predict direction and pace.
The last twenty-five years, viewed over time, show constant
development in virtually all aspects of Chinese society: the econ3. Zhonguo gpngchandangquanguo daibiao dahui.
4. Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui. See National People's Congress, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, http://www.china.org.cn/english/chuangye/55414.
htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
5. XIANFA arts. 2, 3, & 57 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.
cn/constitution/constitution.html. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xian fa [Constitution]
is the Constitution of the People's Republic of China ("PRC").
6. Cf CongressMake-Up Needs Adjusting, CHINA DALY, June 24, 2003 (noting that the
NPC includes 3,000 deputies); China: Political Structure, ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT
(EIU), Dec. 4, 2006 (noting the dominance of the CCP in the NPC).
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omy,7 the fight against poverty,8 construction of rule of law,9 and
level of education.' 0 At the same time, certainly, many problems
associated with rapid development are also apparent: corruption,'1 inequality, t 2 and even popular protests, at times amounting to outright riots.'" In this development, the legal system has
been central and increasingly important. A modernized legal as
well as judicial system is necessary for smooth and continued
progress. The questions that remain concern the pace and ultimately the goal. Will a stagnating development suffice; can the
present course and speed appease the growing discontent; or
will popular demand require stepping up the pace? Similarly,
will a modest reform of the present system be enough? Such
incremental reform might proceed along the spelled out lines of
7. The annual growth rate for China's gross domestic product is some eight percent, ranking it 94 of 177 countries listed in the U.N. Development Programme
("UNDP") Human Development Report of 2004. See UNDP, CULTURAL LIBERTY IN ToDAY'S DIVERSE WORLD: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004, at 139, 143, http://hdr.

undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr4_HDI.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2007). The
human development index ranks countries by life expectancy, adult literacy rate, GDP
per capita, and school enrollment.
8. In the first twenty years after the opening up, China reduced the number of
persons living below the international poverty line by 160 million according to U.N.
statistics. See UNDP, OVERCOMING HUMAN POVERTY:

POVERTY REPORT 2000, at 115,

http://www.undp.org/povertyreport/ENGLISH/ARprofil.pdf
(last visited Feb. 3,
2007).
9. From 1996 to 2005, China moved up in percentile rank from thirty-five to forty,
according to the World Bank's governance indicators on the rule of law. See WORLD
BANK, WGI 2006: WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS COUNTRY SNAPSHOT, http://
info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
10. The adult (above age fifteen) literacy rate in 2004 was ninety-one percent, up
from seventy-eight percent in 1990, according to the UNDP Human Development Index. See UNDP, BEYOND SCARCITY:

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, at 263, 283,

http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDRO6-complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2007).
11. China scored 3.3 out of 10, ranking it 70 on Transparency International's 2006
Corruption Perception Index. See Transparency International, Corruption Perception
Index, http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveysindices/cpi/2006
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2007).
12. China has a Gini Coefficient approaching 0.5, ranking it 90 with only some
thirty countries having larger income inequality. See UNDP, CHINA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, at 13, http://www.undp.org.cn/downloads/nhdr2005/NHDR

2005_complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
13. The number of officially registered riots is increasing in about the same percentage as the economy, nine percent, at least over the last decade, amounting to over
85,000 in 2005. See Geoffrey York, Canada: China's Muse on Ethnic Harmony, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Dec. 18, 2006; see also Matt Nesvisky, Will Super-High Chinese Growth Continue?,
NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/digest/nov06/w12249.html
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2007).
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the present regime towards a more accountable system, yet with
continued dominance of the CCP. On the other hand, will popular demand require a goal that is beyond the reach of the present political system, with introduction of a genuinely multi-party
political system and a truly independent judicial system at the
core of a legal system built on rule of law?
The Supreme People's Court ("SPC") has been at the forefront of legal and judicial reform, at times, according to some
judges, pushing the envelope even beyond what has been "legal.""4 ChiefJustice Xiao Yang, President of the SPC, is expected
to be replaced in 2008 and his successor will likely be announced
by the CCP National Congress. 5 The reform path of the judiciary and in particular of the SPC is particularly indicative of general progress. Before reviewing the last twenty-five years of modernization, however, this Essay must briefly cover a couple thousand years of legal history as a backdrop.
II. THE IMPERIAL ERA
Discussion of the Chinese legal system requires that this Essay at least touch upon the long history of legal development in
China. As Professor Jerome Cohen has put it:
It is a commonplace that the writing of foreign observers
often reveals as much about the assumptions of their own society as it does about those of the society they observe. Certainly, five centuries of Western commentary on the administration of justice in China support this proposition.16

Cohen elaborates with examples of Portuguese merchants
and Spanish missionaries who had already noted in the latter
14. See Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7J.
CHINESE L. 145, 165-66 (1994) (discussing how since the 1980s the Court has increas-

ingly used its power to interpret law where existing law was not existent or insufficient
to handle fast economic and social changes and where the National People's Congress
had not even passed legislation on certain legal issues).
15. Xiao Yang Re-elected China's ChiefJudge, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 2003, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/200303/16/eng20030316_113375.shtml. The 2007 CCP
National Congress will likely give indications of who will succeed the then sixty-nine
year-old Xiao Yang. The informal age limit for Party officials is seventy, and without his
Party status he would arguably not be able to continue as SPC President. See Lowell
Dittmer, Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development, 176 CHINA Q. 903, 914
(2003).
16. Jerome Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and "JudicialIndependence": 19491959, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 967, 967 (1969).
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half of the sixteenth century that the Chinese judges were much
better and fairer than their European counterparts.1 7 Over
time, the depiction in Europe evolved so that by the mid-eighteenth century, Chinese justice was understood as a product of
the Son of Heaven guided by Confucian morals. 1 8 Europeans
constructed an idealized perception of the Chinese justice system that "nicely contrasted with a situation at home that cried
out for reform." 19 This is a lesson that is still highly relevant for
contemporary discussions of legal and judicial reform and potential in China.
The last two millennia have seen various forms of courts in
China. In courts at the lowest level, the most commonly described, a magistrate was in charge of multiple tasks apart from
adjudication and acted as a local representative of the Empire.2 °
The magistrate, far from being a specialized, independent adjudicator as understood in its contemporary meaning, exercised
many responsibilities other than adjudicative functions. 21 This
apparent lack of judicial autonomy was, however, increasingly
addressed over the centuries by efforts to enhance independence and improve the delivery of justice.
Originally, most magistrates were authorized to finally settle
only minor crimes. All other offenses were automatically ap22
pealed through an elaborate process depending on severity.

17. As opposed to Western judicial proceedings that were often secretive, cruel,
and inquisitorial, Chinese trials were conducted in public; and the judges were courteous, diligent, and fair-minded. See id. at 967-68.
18. See id. at 968 (discussing idealized perception of the Chinese justice system that
was prevalent in eighteenth century Europe).
19. Id.; see JOHN H. WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 154-57,
177-78 (Washington Law Book Co. 1936) (1928) (providing first hand accounts of early
foreign observers of the Chinese justice system that express candid admiration for early
Chinese procedures and practitioners).
20. The magistrate was also a public official who acted on routine administrative
matters and orders issued by superior officials. The duties of a magistrate included
maintaining order, collecting taxes, overseeing the postal service, salt administration,

police, public works, granaries, social welfare, education, and religious and commercial
functions. See generally T'UNG-TSU CHO, LocAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER CH'ING 14-

16 (1962).
21. See id.
22. Civil cases and minor criminal cases where punishment was no more than beating or imposing the cangue were usually referred to as tzu-li tz'u-sung (lawsuits under a
magistrate's jurisdiction). Serious cases had to be reported to the magistrate's superiors and his judgments were subject to their approval. The case would then be retried
by at least two superior authorities and reported to the Board of Punishment by the
governor and governor-general. The most serious cases were then retried by the pro-
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For the most severe punishments, the appeal process went all the
way to the upper echelon-a system recently reestablished by the
SPC, again giving it the sole power to decide on the application
2
of the death penalty. 1

From the Tang Dynasty in the seventh century continuously
until the end of the imperial dynasties one hundred years ago,
the magistrates' decisions for all more serious punishments had
to be appealed to higher levels. They were also scrutinized by
censors, called intendants (daotai),24 who fell under the special
ministry-level entity called the Censorate. 25 The censors were
mandated to oversee the correct implementation of law by reviewing decisions, recommending promotions
and demotions,
26
and, in some instances, adjudicating cases.

A recusal system (huibi) was also in place throughout the
centuries, aimed at preventing corruption, local protectionism,
and bias from taking root. Magistrates were rotated between
posts and prevented from serving where they had an interest,
such as locations with relatives in high positions or in or near
their home region.2 7

Even though magistrates were most commonly trained in
the Confucian classics, they acquired experience in law and also
typically had legal specialists drafting decisions before adjudication. 2 ' Law was the basis for adjudication, but often references
vincial judge and each case reported individually to the board by the governor and
governor general. See id. at 116-17.
23. See Supreme Court to "Strictly Control" Death Penalty, CHINA DAILY.COM, Dec. 12,
2006, http://www.chinadaily.com/cn/china/2006-12/28/content_770205.htm
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2007) (reporting that as ofJanuary 1, 2007, the Supreme People's Court
of China took back the power of death penalty review); see also FYRP, infra note 47, 2.
24. Judicial censors regularly participated in the process of judicial review, which
consisted of five basic steps: (1) inspection of the case record; (2) consultation with the
senior local official; (3) consultation with the official in charge of the original trial; (4)
consultation with police officers and witnesses; and (5) consultation with and observation of the offender. See CHARLES 0. HUCKER, THE CENSORIAL SYSTEM OF MING CHINA
237-39 (1966).
25. The Censorate, called Duchayuan under the Tang Dynasty and Yushitai under
the Ming, was a supervisory organ of the Emperor that also acted as a judicial agency.
Meiji Japan borrowed the institution of the Censorate from China in 1869. See PAUL
HENG-CHAO CH'EN, THE FORMATION OF THE EARLY MEIJI LEGAL ORDER:

THE JAPANESE

1871 AND ITS CHINESE FOUNDATION 53 (1981).
26. See BRIAN E. McKNIGHT, LAW AND ORDER IN SUNG CHINA 234 (1992); see also
William P. Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws: Looking Anew at CriminalJustice in Late Imperial China, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1180, 1228 (1984).
27. See CHO, supra note 20, at 21-22.
28. See GEOFFREY MAcCORMACK, TRADITIONAL CHINESE PENAL LAW 11 (1990).
CODE OF

1006

FORDHAM INTERNA TIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1000

were made to Confucian elaborations as further justification of a
verdict or to cover lacunae in the law. 29 Overall, it is important to
recall that history was written by Confucian scholars, who were
likely to stress the Confucian ethics rather than the law.3 °
As the Imperial era came to a close in the late nineteenth
century, efforts were made to import legal institutions from Japan and several European countries." The ensuing unrest after
the collapse of the Empire left few reforms fully implemented,
and the counter-reaction of the Marxist-Leninist era after the
proclamation of the People's Republic of China was certainly
less conducive to the establishment of a modern form of rule of
law. The reasons for many contemporary shortcomings can be
found in more recent history rather than in the Imperial traditions.
III. JUDICIAL REFORM
The reform and opening up of the late 1970s enabled
China to absorb ideas and experiences from abroad once again.
Initially, China focused on revising fundamental legislation covering substance and procedures, such as the Marriage Law and
the Criminal Procedural Law.3 2 At times, drafts were taken off
dusty shelves from drafting efforts of the 1950s with minor revisions. At least the initial urgent demands for a rudimentary legal
system were met. Since then, furious legislative efforts have
been made to update and continue to update laws. The quality,
consistency, and effects of the legislation have also recently become of central concern, shifting the focus from the mere draft29. See Randall Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayalsof China's Alien
"Legal System," 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL L. REV. 37, 50-51 (2003).
30. See Chinese Cultural Studies: Chinese Literature, http://acc6.itsbrooklyn.
cuny.edu/-phalsall/texts/chinlit.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
31. See, e.g.,JLANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE
LAW, ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 17-19 (1999).
32. See Xiaoqing Feng, A Review of the Development of Marriage Law in the People's
Republic of China, 79 U. DET.MERCY L. REv. 331, 331-35 (2002); Stanley Lubman, Bird in
a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After 20 Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 383-87 (2000);
see also Robert Bejesky, PoliticalPluralismand Its InstitutionalImpact on CriminalProcedure
Protections in China: A PhilosophicalEvolution from "Li" to "Fa"and from "Collectivism" to
"Individualism",25 Loy. INT'L & COMp. L. REV.1, 1-13 (2002) (describing the impact of
political pluralism on Chinese criminal procedure protections); Robert Lancaster &
Ding Xiangshun, Addressing the Emergence of Advocacy in the Chinese CriminalJustice System:
A Collaboration Between a U.S. and a Chinese Law School, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 356
(2007).
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ing of a great number of laws. This process is similar at the central level as well as on the various local levels in the Chinese administrative hierarchy. 3
More specifically, judiciary reform took off with the adoption of a law on the organizational structure of courts in the late
1970s.34 Although this law dealt to some extent with judges
through, for example, provisions on appointment, there was a
clear need to lay down further details. A Judges Law was
adopted in 1995," 5 along with a Public Procurators Law,36 and a
law on lawyers in 1996." 7 Reform of the Criminal Procedural
Law also came in 1996, introducing numerous modernizations
to the procedures that largely had been based on a Soviet-inspired version from the 1950s.3 8 Specifically, the Judges Law introduced the foundation for a more specialized, professional judiciary, distinct from the administration by, for example, establishing a salary system separate from that of the administration.3 9
The Judges Law also emphasized justice4" and professional eth33. See Lubman, supra note 32, at 384-86. Administratively, there are three levels
of government in urban and five levels in rural areas, with People's congresses at these
levels. See generally Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50
AM. J.COMp. L. 369, 388-93 (2002) (explaining Chinese legislative structures and procedures).
34. Organic Law of the People's Courts (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong.,July 1, 1979, effectiveJan. 1, 1980, revised Sep. 2, 1983), translated
in ISINOLAW (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.). The Organic Law of the People's
Courts was adopted in 1979 and revised in 1983 to conform to the 1982 Constitution.
This law addresses the general structure and organization of the court system as well as
the procedure for judicial and administrative appointments.
35. Judges Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb
28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995, revisedJune 30, 2001), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited
Feb. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.).
36. Public Procurators Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995, amended June 30, 2001), http://www.npc.
gov.cn/zgrdw/english/news/newsDetail.jsp?id=2204&articleld=345078
(last visited
Feb. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.).
37. Lawyers Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., May
15, 1996, effectiveJan. 1, 1997, revised Dec. 29, 2001), translatedin ISINOtAw (last visited
Feb 1. 2007) (P.R.C.).
38. Criminal Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong.), translated in IsINoLAw (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.); see also Harold J.
Berman et al., A Comparison of Chinese and Soviet Codes of CriminalLaw and Procedure, 73J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 238, 238 (1982) (stating that Soviet texts served as a model for
Chinese criminal law texts).
39. Judges Law, supra note 37, arts. 36-38.
40. Id. art. 1.
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ics, 1 as well as various reinforced measures aimed at improving
qualifications and preventing bias. The use of the term 'judge"
(faguan) itself, as opposed to "adjudicator" (shenpanyuan), which
had been used in the organizational law is also indicative of the
change. Revisions to the Judges Law as well as the Procuratorate
Law in 2001 included an entrance requirement that had already
been in place for lawyers for some years: a bar exam.4 2 The new
Unified Judicial Exam has been administered almost annually
with a very high threshold inspired by the Japanese Bar Exam,
aimed at enhancing the quality of the staff and boosting credibility. 43 Later in 2001, the SPC also introduced a Code of Judicial
Ethics for Judges, emphasizing in particular the impartiality of
judges."
In 1999, the SPC also adopted a Five-Year Reform Platform
("FYRP") with some fifty proposed reform measures.4 5 In the
Spring 2000, the SPC President presented the platform to the
NPC, and the Central Committee of the CCP approved the FYRP
later that year.46 The FYRP recognized restraints on judicial independence based on four widely recognized problems: local
protectionism, low professional and moral standards, the bu41. Id. art. 7(5).
42. See Zou KEYtUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM:

TowARDS THE RULE OF LAW 209-10

(2006). There are expectations that the Judges Law will have to be revised again within
the near future. See Qianfan Zhang, The People's Court in Transition: The Prospect of the
Chinese Judicial Reform, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 69, 89 (2003).
43. See Zou, supra note 42, at 218-19, 222.
44. See J.J. Spigelman AC, C.J. New South Wales, Convergence and the Judicial
Role: Recent Developments in China, Address at the China Education Centre, University of Sydney (July 11, 2002), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/su(noting that SPC
premecourt/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO-speech-spigelman_110702
promulgated a Code of Judicial Ethics for Judges on October 18, 2001).
45. Renmin Fayuan Wunian Caige Gangyao [Outline of the Five-Year Reform Plan of the
People's Courts], Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi [Research Office of the Supreme People's Court], Beijing: Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe [Supreme People's Court Publisher],
2000 (noting that the Plan discusses fifty points total under three large categories and
seven sub-categories). The central reform platforms are also coupled with local reform
initiatives at the level of High Courts at the provincial level. See also Yuwen Li, Court

Reform in China: Problem, Progress and Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 55, 74 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002) ("[The Reform Program]
contains a total of fifty articles, of which thirty-nine concern specific measures of reform.").
46. Shigui Tan, Zhongguo Sifa Gaige Yanjiu [Research on Judicial Reform in China],
Beijing: Falfi chubanshe [Law Publisher], 2001, at 55. For a general description of the
Reform Programme, see Li, supra note 45, at 74-77.
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reaucratic management model, and lack of resources.4 7 The
FYRP emphasizes selection criteria for judges as well as increased
independence of those actually involved in the adjudication of
specific cases. 48 Details included: establishing more independent panels of judges (heyi-, durenting);49 reducing the powers of
the "adjudicative committees" (shenpan weiyuanhui), as well as

those of the court leaders in case specifics;5" introducing authoritative and highly qualified presiding judges (shenpanzhang);51
and making the adjudicative personnel of the courts more distinct from other staff, such as court clerks.5 2
The stated goal in the FYRP was to make the judiciary fair
and more efficient.5" This was reiterated in a Second FYRP introduced in 2005, 5 4 which again stressed reforming the "adjudi47. See Renmin Fayuan Wunian Gaige Gangyao [Five Year Reform Platform],
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200511/20051128111114.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2007) [hereinafter FYRP]; see also Zhang, supra note 39, at 87.
48. See FYRP, supra note 47, 1 18, 20; see also Zou Keyuan, JudicialReform in China:
Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 36 INT'L LAw. 1039, 1045-46 (2002) (discussing
selection criteria for judges).
49. See FYRP, supra note 47, 20; see alsoJerome A. Cohen, China's Legal Reform at
the Crossroads, FAR. E. ECON. R., Mar. 2006 (noting the FYRP's "cautious awareness of
brining greater professionalism, independence and integrity to the judiciary").
50. See FYRP, supra note 47, 21; see also Zou, supra note 48, at 1046 (noting that
"[f]or the purposes of safeguarding judicial fairness and integrity, the Reform Programme stressed the importance of establishing an internal check-and-balance mechanism to strengthen the adjudicating supervisory system").
51. See FYRP, supra note 47,
18; see also Zou, supra note 48, at 1046.
52. See FYRP, supra note 47, 1 22; see also Zou, supra note 48, at 1046.
53. The first FYRP was presented to the NPC only in Spring 2000 and approved by
the Party later that year. See Susan Finder, Court System, in DOING BuSINESS IN CHINA 1, 3
(Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Deringer ed., 2002).
54. See Renmin Fayuan Dierge Wunian Gaige Gangyao [2nd Five Year Reform Platform], http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200512/20051214221735.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter 2nd FYRP]. On March 9, 2005, the SPC Work Report released to the NPC an outline of Chinese judicial reform goals for 2005 and announced
that a more detailed second FYRP would soon follow. See Congressional-Executive Commission on China ("CECC"), SPC Work Report Reveals Direction ofJudicial Reform for
2005, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=9030 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007). It was not until October 2005, however, that the second FYRP was
actually issued. See Susan Finder, Reforming the People's Courts, CHINA LAw & PRCTICE,
June 2006, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/default.asp?Page=5&F=F&SID=
5052&M=6&Y=2006 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007). For a partial translation of the text into
English, see CECC, Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People's Courts (20042008) (CECC Partial Translation), http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.
phpd?showsingle=38564 (last visited Feb. 3, 2007). CECC was created by Congress in
October 2000, with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and
the Congress. See Pub. L. No. 106-286, §§ 301-309, 114 Stat. 880 (2000).
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cative committees," furthering the reform initiated in the first
FYRP, 55 and regularizing the use of lay judges (peishenyuan).56
The second FYRP also sought to reform the "rehearing"
(zaishen) system, enabling final decisions to be reopened,5 7 and
to strengthen enforcement of decisions, 58 focusing on the
branch-courts,5 9 tribunals (fating) sitting below the local courts
(jicengfayuan).6° It featured the well-known plan to take back
final decision-making power from the provincial level high
courts (gaojifayuan) in death penalty cases. 6' More detailed re-

forms address the method of assigning cases to the various
courts and judges 62 and make the appellate process more transparent and more distinct from first level hearings.6 3 In another
fundamental reform, higher levels of government would supplement corresponding levels of funding of judges' salaries and
court finances if current levels do not reach a minimum threshold. 6 4 Incidentally, higher level funding, even though only partially available, may prove to dramatically shift power in favor of
a stronger and more independent central judiciary, if the funding is at all realizable. The second FYRP limited its proposals to
a handful of areas, even though it has implications for numerous
more detailed issues. The second FYRP may be more realistic,
dealing more with internal matters of the judiciary,6 5 prescribing
55. See 2nd FYRP, supra note 54, 1 23-25.
56. See id. 27 (noting the goal of improving the people's jury system).
57. See id. 9.
58. See id. 20 (noting the objective of improving enforcement efficiency, decreasing costs, excluding interferences and assuring that the winning party can timely realize
legal fights).
59. The first FYRP purported to limit the number of tribunals, and it seemed as if
their importance was diminishing. See FYRP, supra note 47, 1 27. In the second FYRP,
such diminution is not as clear or at least is not formulated as explicitly. See generally 2nd
FYRP, supra note 54.
60. See 2nd FYRP, supra note 54.
61. See id. 1 2.
62. See id. 30 (noting the goal of developing and perfecting a random case distribution system which considers the type and difficulty of each case).
63. See id. 11 10, 12.
64. See id. 48.
65. See Cohen, supra, note 49 (noting of the FYRP that "[o]ther goals involve internal reforms that are less observable to outsiders or even lawyers"). But see Mei Ying
Gechlik, JudicialReform in China: Lessons from Shanghai, 19 COL. J. ASIAN L. 97 (2005)
(noting that "[i]nterviewed experts believe that current Chinese leaders, though seen
as moderate reformers, are not ready to allow fundamental reforms in these areas.")
(citations to Chinese academics omitted).
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what some judges call "reforms" that are within the ambit of the
law.
IV. FUTURE REFORMS
The Chinese judiciary centralized under the SPC is a challenging structure, with its four-tiers, 3,500 courts, 66 and 170,000
judges. The SPC's problematic position concerns its relationship with horizontal entities such as the NPC and the
Procuratorate. At the vertical level, the judiciary lacks the powers of funding and allocation of resources. This stems from the
fact that corresponding levels of congress and government approve prospective judges.6 7 Compounding this is the omnipresence of the Party at all levels, influencing selection and approval
ofjudges, promotions and work allocation, and at times, directly
and indirectly, the outcome of specific adjudications.6 Party influence at the local level is not always the central Party line but
can also be that of the local government or other local interests.
This influence and its weakness in relation to the center are not
necessarily negative from a narrow perspective, but viewed from
a broader perspective, local influence may still undermine the
credibility of the judiciary.6 9
The reform platforms, along with more regular updates of
the basic legislation, seek to resolve some of these fundamental
issues. It is not a simple task. The SPC is often at the front line
of reform, but is not always in agreement or in pace with-typically ahead of-the rest of the legal and political reforms-overall, or as seen by other entities. The SPC and the various compo66. See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, The Politicaland Practical Obstacles to the Reform of the
Judiciary and the Establishment of a Rule of Law in China, 10J. CHINESE POL. Sci. 43, 52
(2005) (noting that "[i]n 2004, there were 220,000 judges (against 70,000 in 1988),
including 30,000 senior judges, working in some 3,500 courts"). If the branch-courts or
People's Tribunals ("PTs") of the basic courts are included, the number increases to
more than ten thousand. See Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research in Chinese Law, in
RULE OF LAW: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES

164, 180 (2003) (specifying the number of People's Tribunals as 12,000 by the end of
1999) (citing LAW YEARBOOK [falu ninjian] 135 (2000)). According to other sources,
the number of PTs is much higher. See, e.g., CHOW, supra note 44, at 200 (citing the
number of People's Tribunals as over 30,000).
67. See, e.g., Susan Finder, supra note 53, at 13, 14; see also Randall Peerenboom,
Judicial Independence in China (unpublished manuscript 2006) (on file with author).
68. See Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 7J.
CHINESE L. 145, 149 (1993); see also Peerenboom, supra note 67, at 2.
69. See Peerenboom, supra note 67, at 2, 32-33.
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nents of the judiciary are pushing ahead reforms that are possible at present.7" The proposed reforms leave out, however,
many of the overarching issues that lie beyond the control of the
judiciary that would have to be included in a viable reform plan.
The SPC President has stated that the reforms so far have dealt
with pressing
problems, but the future requires larger scale re1
form.

7

In 2003, the Standing Committee of the Politburo appointed a coordinating group for judicial institutional reform
(zhongyang sifa tizhi gaige lingdao xiaozu, the Central Reform
Group, "CRG"), under the leadership of State Councillor, Luo
Gan, with other prestigious positions also going to Party members. 72 The Group coordinates the reform measures between
the judiciary, the procuratorate, and other actors in the legal
sphere. The name of this group includes not only the term 'judicial," but also "institutional." The initial, simply labeled 'judicial reform" (sifa gaige) was changed to 'judicial institutional reform" (sifa tizhi gaige) by the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, a
significant change in the context. In October 2006, during the
most recent session of the Central Party Committee (sixth session of the 16th Congress), they added to judicial institutional
reform, the word "mechanism" (judicial institutional reform, sifa
tizhi jizhi gaige). 7" Apparently, the People's Congresses do not
wish to give up their power to appointjudges for the benefit of a
more centralized judicial system.
Nevertheless, the FYRPs are on the table. The reform measures may be facing tough battles to be implemented as the
evolving phraseology seems to suggest. Reform platforms may
be put in place simply to please the central level demands for
action with more symbolic plans, without willingness to really
70. See, e.g., Speech of Xiao Yang, Fayuan, faguan yu sifa gaige [The Courts,
Judges, and Judicial Reform], 1 FAxuEjI

[JuRIsTS REVIEW] 2003 (discussing constitu-

tional and legal reforms as necessities for further reform).
71. See Xiao Yang: Faguan Meiyou Sili; Kaichuang Sifa Weimin Xin Jingfie (dawen)
Xiao Yang: Judges without PersonalInterests; Creating a New Horizon ofJustice to the People
(interview)], ZHONGXIN WANG [CHINA NEws NET], Oct. 15, 2003.

72. Zhongyang Sifa Tizhi Gaige Lingdao Xiaozu [Prospectsfor theJudicialReform of 2005,
Preventing theJudiciaryfrom CausingPublic Outcry], SOHU.COM, Jan. 7, 2004.
73. See Zhongguo GongchangdangDi Shiliuju Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di Liuci Quanti
Huiyi Gongbao [Meeting Report of the 6th Plenary of the CCP's 16th Central Committee],
XJNHUA WANG [NEW CHINA NEws AGENCY], Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://news.

xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/1I/content_5190605.htm
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change much on the ground. Reform plans may also be
launched to test the extent of actual reform possible by pushing
the agenda. A combination of these explanations is likely behind the reform scheme. For more effective reform, the CRG,
the Party coordinating group, would have to take a stronger
lead. With increasing unrest in China and calls for a "harmonious society," incentives for the Party to boost the credibility of
the legal system with a more independent judiciary at its core
may be forthcoming.7 4 The 2007 National Congress, at which
the SPC President's replacement like will be positioned, may be
an essential catalyst for further reform. Candidates for the position are likely closer to the Party than to the SPC. At first, this
may seem to be a regression of the reform process, and that may
be the case; but the change may also give the SPC the higher
status needed for the reform process to be more effective against
the horizontal and vertical challenges. As Professor Randall
Peerenboom has argued, the clear advantage of the Chinese
Communist Party is the coordinating powers they have, which
enable diverging agendas to merge.7 5
The reform process of the Chinese judiciary in particular
over the last twenty-five years and even more so in the last decade is impressive. Within-and at times beyond-the scope of
what seems possible, the judiciary has been making headway towards enhanced professionalization, stature, and independence.
Reform in the future is likely to continue along these same
tracks. Nevertheless, with stronger incentives to resolve societal
problems, a more progressive development is not unlikely. A
case in point is the now well-known return to the SPC of the final
adjudicative power in death penalty cases-a possible first effort
to take back more power from local courts. The reform process
continues, and even though all problems will not be solved by
2008, the development, albeit slow, is quite positive.

74. See Joseph Kahn, China Makes Commitment to Social Harmony, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2006, at A14; Maureen Fan, China'sParty LeadershipDeclares New Priority: "Harmonious
Society," WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18.

75. See generally Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 161 (2001).

